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Political scientists rarely take full advantage of the substantive inferences that they can draw from time-series cross-
section data. Most studies have emphasized statistical significance and other standard inferences that can be drawn
from single coefficients over one time period. We show that by simulating the quantities of interest over longer
periods of time and across theoretically interesting scenarios, we can draw much richer inferences. In this article, we
present a technique that produces graphs of dynamic simulations of relationships over time. Graphical simulations
are useful because they represent long-term relationships between key variables and allow for examination of the
impact of exogenous and/or endogenous shocks. We demonstrate the technique’s utility by graphically representing
key relationships from two different works. We also present a preliminary version of the dynsim command, which
we have designed to extend the Clarify commands in order to produce dynamic simulations.
I
n recent years, Time-Series Cross-Sectional
(TSCS) data have become more available to
political scientists, presenting researchers with
an interesting combination of promise and problems.
On the one hand, TSCS data allow researchers
opportunities to gain variance on theoretically critical
variables that do not vary much within individual
units over time. But, on the other hand, models esti-
mated from these data can be plagued by a partic-
ularly daunting list of statistical obstacles that can lead
to faulty hypothesis-testing inferences. Given the
challenges posed by the simultaneous occurrence
of problems associated with time-series data (e.g.,
nonstationarity and autocorrelation), problems associ-
ated with cross-sectional data (e.g., heteroskedasticity),
and problems unique to TSCS data (e.g., contempora-
neous error correlation), it is not surprising that political
methodologists have spent a lot of time worrying about
testing assumptions and estimating believable covariance
matrices (Beck and Katz 1995; Green, Kim, and Yoon
2001; Stimson 1985).
We agree with this emphasis on getting believable
estimates and avoiding spurious conclusions. But we
think that it is important that once an applied re-
searcher has successfully navigated the minefield of
statistical obstacles presented by TSCS data, they fully
explore the implications of their results. Outside of the
TSCS world, political scientists have recognized the
importance of simulating the effects of shocks on long-
term estimates with the use of methods such as error-
correction models (see De Boef and Keele 2008 for a
review), vector-autoregression, and graphical interpre-
tations of these shocks with impulse-response functions
(see Freeman, Williams, and Lin 1989 for a review).
This call to make the most out of complicated estimates
is in tune with another set of recent works in political
methodology that have called for less reliance on
numerical interpretations of statistical significance and
more emphasis on simulations to produce helpful
graphical depictions of statistical and substantive sig-
nificance (e.g., King, Tomz, and Wittenberg 2000).
In the remaining sections we begin with a brief
overview of common practices for interpreting models
estimated with TSCS data. We then make a general
case for conducting dynamic simulations by illustrat-
ing their usefulness on two political science research
applications with the use of an original Stata com-
mand called dynsim. We conclude with a discussion of
the usefulness of long-term dynamic simulations.
Current Practices
The autoregressive nature of a great deal of political
phenomena requires that scholars include a lagged de-
pendent variable for theoretical and/or methodological
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reasons. As De Boef and Keele (2008) point out, doing
so allows scholars to explore a number of quantities of
interest that describe dynamic relationships (e.g., long-
term effects, long-run equilibrium).1 A simple review of
articles published in the American Journal of Political
Science (AJPS) and the American Political Science Review
(APSR) reveals that very few authors produce graphical
depictions of these dynamic relationships (12.2% and
15.8%, respectively) and even fewer provide appro-
priate measures of uncertainty (2% and 10.5%, re-
spectively). We argue that these percentages are too
low and that they represent missed opportunities
for important substantive inferences.
As an example of these missed opportunities, con-
sider an article published by David Rueda in the APSR
(Rueda 2005). Rueda advances a compelling argument
that, in terms of employment policy preferences, la-
borers should be divided into those whose employment
is relatively secure (insiders) and those who are more
vulnerable (outsiders). Because insiders will tend to be
the core supporters of Social Democratic parties, Rueda
theorizes that we should see increases in employment
protection measures during periods of left government.
To test this empirical claim, Rueda estimated a TSCS
model of severance pay as a function of cabinet par-
tisanship and a series of control variables including a
one-year lag of the dependent variable. The coefficient
on his main variable of interest, cabinet partisanship, is
found to be in the expected direction and statistically
significant with a one-tailed p-value of .037. From
Table 1, we can see that most authors of the studies
that we surveyed (published between 2002 and 2006)
stopped at this point in the interpretation of their TSCS
models. Rueda, however, correctly interpreted this effect,
in the presence of a lagged dependent variable, as the
short-term effect of a one-unit change in the independ-
ent variable on his dependent variable. He then pro-
ceeded to report the long-term effect of this change in
the independent variable, estimated from the following
formula: LTEX1 ¼ b^1f^where b^ is the parameter estimate
for the independent variable of interest and f^ is the
parameter estimate for the lagged dependent variable.
Although this is also a correct interpretation, it is a point
estimate for which Rueda did not report any measure of
uncertainty.2
A particularly helpful way of representing these
dynamic relationships is through graphical depictions
of the long-run expected values for substantively inter-
esting scenarios. Our version of this type of inferential
approach, which we label ‘‘dynamic simulation,’’ can
be carried out as within-sample inferences (assuming
that the values of all of the independent variables are
known) or as out-of-sample forecasts (in which we can
choose to incorporate a variety of different types of
uncertainty).3 Across the range of choices in terms of
1As De Boef and Keele (2008) point out, it is the specification of a
lagged dependent variable on the right-hand side of a model that
makes it dynamic. Although De Boef and Keele produce a number
of insightful graphs for interpretation of dynamic relationships,
they do not produce long-run depictions of the dependent variable
under different scenarios as we do in with our dynamic simu-
lations. It is also worth noting that while our focus in this article is
on TSCS models, all of our discussion applies equally well to
models of a single time series. Our Stata command produces
simulations for time-series models as well as TSCS models.
2One can calculate measures of uncertainty for long-term effects
in a number of ways: by simulation techniques or by calculating
the analytical standard errors with the following formula:
var a
b
  ¼ 1
b2
 
var að Þ þ a2
b4
 
var bð Þ  2 a
b3
 
cov a; bð Þ where, in this
case, b ¼ 1 f^ and f^ is the parameter estimate on the lagged
dependent variable (De Boef and Keele 2008; 192). Another way
to measure the long-term coefficient is by using the Bewley
(1979) transformation of the autoregressive distributed lag
(ADL) model, which is described in De Boef and Keele (2008;
192). Note that throughout this article and the supplementary
materials document, when we refer to the work of other authors,
we use their original notation.
3Greene (2003, . 571–80) provides an excellent discussion forecast-
ing in the context of autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) models.
He starts with a general formula for ARDL models as follows:






bjxtj þ dwt þ et where m is the mean of
y, x is an independent variable for which we wish to model the
dynamic properties as they pertain to y, wt is another independent
variable whose dynamic properties are appropriately captured by
d, and et is a well-behaved error process that meets the assump-
tions of OLS. For ease of exposition, Greene collapses the
nonendogenous RHS variables to mt ¼ mþ +
r
j¼0
bjxtj þ dwt so
that the model becomes yt ¼ mt þ +
p
i¼1
giyti þ et which simplifies
to yt ¼ mþ g1yt1 þ . . .þ gpytp þ et . He then provides a nice
discussion of the three different sources of error in forecasting, ‘‘To
form a prediction interval, we will be interested in the variance of
the forecast error: eTþ1jT ¼ y^Tþ1jT  yTþ1 This error will arise from
three sources. First, in forecasting mt, there will be two sources of
error. The parameters, m, d, and b0; . . . ;br will have been estimated
so m^Tþ1jT will differ from m^Tþ1 because of the sampling variation in
these estimators. Second, if the exogenous variables, xT11 and wT11
have been forecasted, then to the extent that these forecasts are
themselves imperfect, yet another source of error to the forecast will
result. Finally, although we will forecast eTþ1 with its expectation of
zero, we would not assume that the actual realization will be zero, so
this step will be a third sources of error. In principle, an estimate of
the forecast error variance Var eTþ1jT
 
would account for all three
sources of error’’ (576). However, as Greene goes on to point out, in
practice this is nearly impossible. As we noted, we have written our
Stata command such that there are options for including forecasting
uncertainty such as that discussed by Greene and also the formula
provided by Enders (2004). However, since most inferences from
statistical models in political science fall into the ‘‘within-sample
inferences’’ category, we will continue in this tradition with the
dynamic simulations presented here.
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error structures (e.g., panel-corrected standard errors
vs. OLS), and sources of uncertainty, analytical and
simulation-based methods lead to the same dynamic
inferences.4 Our preferred method is to use the Clarify
program to simulate expected values over the long-
term. While it is not computationally difficult to
calculate long-term expected values, it is somewhat
tedious to produce the computer code necessary to
generate figures that display these calculations over
multiple time periods. In order to make these types of
long-term dynamic simulations more accessible to
scholars, we created a Stata command called dynsim
that automates this process. Each predicted value is
generated according to the formula ~y ¼ XC~bþ ~e,
where ~b is a vector of simulated effect coefficients,
XC is a matrix of user-specified values of variables, and
~e is one draw from N 0; ~s2ð Þ(Tomz, Wittenberg, and
King 2003, 26). It is dynamic in the sense that it
incorporates a lagged dependent variable in each
iterative estimation. At each iteration, the predicted
value of the dependent variable given the scenario
specified (~yCjXC) is used as the value of the lagged
dependent variable (yt-1) for the next iteration (to
calculate ~yt). In order to view the impact of key
variables on the long-term dynamics, the series must
be autoregressive, as shown by a statistically significant
lagged dependent variable.5 While few researchers
make any attempt to present a dynamic interpretation
of their findings, as Table 1 indicates, those who do
seldom accompany their dynamic interpretations with
confidence intervals or other appropriate indications
of the estimated uncertainty surrounding their point
estimates. In recent years, presenting some indication
of uncertainty for substantive inferences has become
standard in most areas of political science research. We
see no reason why dynamic inferences should be an
exception to this norm.
Our command uses King, Tomz, and Wittenberg’s
(2000) Clarify statistical package to present long-term
dynamics for autoregressive relationships of contin-
uous dependent variables. For a user-specified num-
ber of iterations, dynsim uses the n draws from the
asymptotic sampling distribution with mean equal to
the point estimates of the parameters and variance
equal to the variance-covariance matrix of estimates
(Clarify’s estsimp) and the real or hypothetical values
for the user-specified scenario, XC (Clarify’s setx), to
simulate n expected values of the dependent variable
(Clarify’s simqi) (Williams and Whitten 2011).6
Studies like Rueda’s would benefit from graphical
depictions of substantively interesting dynamic sim-
ulations. For instance, it would be interesting to look
at the impact of left-leaning versus right-leaning gov-
ernments on employment policies over longer periods
of time. Dynamic simulations allow researchers to
make much richer and more nuanced inferences
about dynamic relationships. Since the figures con-
tain confidence intervals, it is possible to determine
which relationships produce statistically significant
effects in both the short- and long-term. Using this
indication of uncertainty, we can then make addi-
tional inferences about whether scenarios have stat-
istically different expected values at time t, and
whether the expected value is statistically different
over time. Not only can long-term dynamic simu-
lations show the effects of key variables, but they also
can illustrate how the predicted values respond to
exogenous shocks and changes in the values of
TABLE 1 Percentage of Articles in Leading Journals
with Models of TSCS Data that Contain
Dynamic Interpretations, 2002–2006
Journal





Any type of dynamic
interpretation
14.3% 31.6%
Any graphical depiction of
dynamic inferences
12.2% 15.8%
Any type of dynamic interpretation
with any measure of uncertainty
2.0% 10.5%
4Our supplementary materials document contains two pieces of
evidence to this effect. First, we provide a replication of Beck and
Katz’s classic Monte Carlo experiments using Clarify and ana-
lytical methods of estimation. The results across these two
methods of estimation are almost indistinguishable. And, second,
we provide a set of the same forecasts using dynamic simulations
(built out of Clarify) and analytical methods. The confidence
intervals for these pairs of forecasts were so close to each other
that we had to use a statistical jittering technique to show them
on the same figure.
5We warn against using any sort of dynamic simulation on an
integrated series, as shown by a coefficient for the lagged
dependent variable in which we cannot reject the null that the
coefficient is equal to 1. Beck and Katz (2004) point out
that researchers should not use stationary methods to analyze
nonstationary data, as the causal inferences are likely to be grossly
misleading. We therefore suggest ensuring that all series are
stationary before estimating any dynamic simulations.
6Please see Williams and Whitten (2011) for a lengthy explan-
ation of the details of how this command works. The Stata ado
file can be downloaded at ‘‘web.missouri.edu~williamslaro/.’’
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interactive relationships. We suggest that scholars
fully explore these long-term effects in dynamic
relationships so that they can make the full slate of
inferences but also so that they can avoid making
inferences that are only valid when examining effects
in the short-term.
To illustrate our point, we provide two applied
examples in which we are able to obtain additional
substantive inferences by pushing our interpretation
of TSCS models beyond simple point estimates and
t-tests for short-term effects.
Two Illustrations
In this section, we illustrate the usefulness of present-
ing figures that depict the long-term dynamics of
relationships. Modeling long-term dynamics allows
for a much richer interpretation of the substantive
effects of independent variables on the processes under
examination. We begin with an example from an
article by Poe and Tate (1994) in which they tested a
series of theories about the determinants of state
repression using data from 153 countries measured
for eight consecutive years.
Example 1: Poe and Tate (1994)
The authors build a model of state repression based
on a number of hypothesized relationships. The level
of state repression should be lower in nations with
higher levels of democracy, higher levels of economic
development, and with a British cultural influence.
Other factors should lead to higher levels of state
repression: nations experiencing rapid economic
growth, nations with rapid population growth, and
nations under leftist or military regimes. Internal or
external instability, characterized by civil and interna-
tional war, is hypothesized to lead to more state
repression. They test their hypotheses with an OLS
estimation with White’s robust standard errors and
include a lagged dependent variable in the model to
help correct for serially correlated errors (Beck and
Katz 1996).7
In Table 2, we present the replicated results for
their model with state repression operationalized as
Amnesty International’s personal integrity rights
and democracy measured with Freedom House’s
political rights index (Poe and Tate 1994; 861,
Model 1, Table 1).
Parameter estimates for the lagged dependent
variable, level of democracy, population size, eco-
nomic standing, and civil and international wars are
statistically significant in the expected directions.
Poe and Tate (1994) also provide graphical repre-
sentations of the statistically significant variables of
interest for the four estimated models. Their Figures
1–4 (in Poe and Tate 1994; 862–65) show the esti-
mated changes in the predicted repression score over
10 years as a result of a loss of democracy, increase in
economic standing, and presence of international war
and civil war.
The figures that Poe and Tate (1994) present are
helpful in that they present postestimation interpre-
tations beyond what we see in most of the recent
literature. The figures, however, lack measures of
uncertainty, so it is impossible to know which
relationships are statistically significant. Our postes-
timation interpretation procedures can present effec-
tively the long-range dynamics of multiple scenarios
and thus improve the causal inferences drawn from
this research. When this is done, we can make two
types of substantive inferences. First, we can note
whether the two scenarios are significantly different
from each other at any time period, and second,
whether the predicted repression score for a given
scenario at time t is statistically different from its
score at any other time period.
Figure 1 presents the predicted Amnesty Interna-
tional human rights score (and 95% confidence
intervals represented by the bars) over eight years
for three different scenarios based on the same
independent variables but holding economic standing
at its minimum, mean and maximum, respectively.8
This type of figure has at least two advantages
over graphs of the point estimates. First, placing 95%
confidence intervals around the prediction substan-
tially improves our inferential power. By comparing
the simulated 95% confidence intervals for our
different scenarios in the same year, we can now see
that a country with the maximum level of economic
standing has a level of human rights abuses that is
statistically indistinguishable from the other two
7Several different authors have pointed out that many applied
researchers have wrongly inferred from Beck and Katz’s seminal
article that a lagged dependent variable is the magical cure for all
dynamic problems (e.g., Beck 2007; Beck and Katz 2004; Kittel
and Winner 2005).
8The values of the other independent variables are held at either
their means (for continuous variables) or their modes (for binary
variables). Democracy, population size, change in population, and
change in GNP per capita are held at their sample means, while
left government, military control, British cultural influence,
civil war, and international wars are held at their sample modes
(0 in all cases).
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cases (mean and minimum economic standing) in
year 19. In year 2, this difference becomes statistically
significantly lower and continues to decrease through-
out the simulated time period. It is also apparent that
by year 4 the level of human rights abuses in the
country with the maximum level of economic standing
is statistically different from what it was in this same
nation during year 1.
Dynamic simulations may also help researchers
to avoid making mistakes of interpretation. Figure 1
leads to a substantively different conclusion than the
one reached by Poe and Tate (1994). Rather than as-
suming that an increase in economic standing pro-
duces the same beneficial response at all levels of
economic standing, our figure shows that repression
scores are only statistically lower for the states with the
highest level of economic standing. In other words, out
of the three scenarios of economic standing, the only
scenario that is statistically different from the others in
the long-run is the scenario with the maximum level of
economic standing. This is the case throughout the last
seven years of the simulation.
Poe and Tate argue that both civil and interna-
tional wars increase the level of repression in a state.
These findings are corroborated by the figures in their
paper (their Figures 3 and 4), showing the change in
TABLE 2 Replication Results for the Determinants of State Repression (Model 1, Poe and Tate 1994; 861)
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.) [90% CI]
Personal integrity abuset-1 0.730** (0.024) [0.691, 0.768]
Democracy -0.045** (0.013) [-0.066, -0.024]
Population size 0.053** (0.010) [0.037, 0.069]
Population change 0.008 (0.012) [-0.012, 0.028]
Economic standing -0.008* (0.003) [-0.013, -0.002]
Economic growth -0.001 (0.001) [-0.003, 0.001]
Leftist government -0.035 (0.054) [-0.123, 0.054]
Military control 0.046 (0.047) [-0.032, 0.123]
British cultural influence -0.030 (0.040) [-0.095, 0.036]
International war 0.208** (0.079) [0.077, 0.338]
Civil war 0.327** (0.077) [0.200, 0.454]





*p , 0.05 (two-tailed test); **p , 0.01 (two-tailed test).
Note: Cell entries indicate OLS coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses and 90% confidence intervals in brackets.
FIGURE 1 Dynamic Simulations of the Effects of
Economic Standing on Personal
Integrity Rights9It is worth noting that even though an independent variable may
have a statistically significant estimated effect on the dependent
variable, such effects do not always generate correspondingly
statistically significant differences between predicted values. We
see an example of this when we compare the results in Table 2
with those presented in Figure 1. The difference between two
otherwise identical nations where one has the mean value for
economic standing (3.516) and one has the minimum value
(0.087) is clearly statistically significant (since we can see from
Table 2 that a one unit shift in this variable is statistically
significant). But the two 95% confidence intervals for these
otherwise identical scenarios clearly overlap in Figure 1. This is
the case because the variance for an OLS parameter estimate is
calculated as var b^
  ¼ s2
+ XiXð Þ2
while the variance for the
predicted value of the dependent variable is calculated as
varðY0jx0 ¼ s2½1þ x00ðX
0
XÞ1x0, where x0 is the specified val-
ues of the Xs (see, for example Gujarati 2003; 941–42). Assess-
ments of statistical significance using predicted values of the
dependent variable will thus always be more conservative.
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repression scores during times of civil and interna-
tional war. When we model the long-term dynamics
of the effects of interstate and civil wars on repres-
sion, we can make additional inferences regarding
this relationship. Figure 2 shows the predicted re-
pression score (and 95% confidence intervals) for
three cases that are identical in year 0. These cases
diverge in year 1 with one case having no conflict,
one case experiencing a civil war, and one case
embroiled in an interstate war.10 In year 1, the case
with no conflict has a statistically lower level of
repression than the the case undergoing a civil war.
Although their point estimates differ as expected,
none of the other pairwise comparisons of cases are
statistically distinguishable. In year 2, the case with
no conflict is statistically lower than both cases with
conflict, but the two conflict cases cannot be statisti-
cally separated. In year 4, we see that the two cases
with conflict are barely statistically distinguishable
with repression being higher in the case with a civil
war than in the case experiencing interstate conflict.
Example 2: Whitten and Williams (2011)
Our next illustration comes from research on the
political economy of defense spending (Whitten and
Williams 2011). The authors begin with the observa-
tion that OECD democracies have been in a state of
relative international security in the post-WWII
period. Without the presence of international con-
flicts that threaten a state’s existence, partisan actors
have greater leeway to use defense spending to meet
the needs of their domestic constituents. Rather than
the traditional viewpoint of ‘‘guns versus butter,’’
they suggest that, based on the empirical evidence of
the relationship between military spending and eco-
nomic indicators, this cliche´ should be modified to
‘‘guns yield butter.’’ As a result, they expect that
partisan leaders will use the low-level international
conflicts that have characterized this era as oppor-
tunities to alter defense spending to satisfy their
domestic constituencies. Rather than assuming that
there is only one relevant dimension of partisan
preferences (right versus left) that influences de-
fense spending, they show that two ideological
dimensions—a government’s welfare position and
its international peace position—have impacts on
defense spending. Governments that favor hawkish
positions or more generous welfare spending will
have higher levels of defense spending than more
dovish or austere governments. They find that these
partisan effects appear even while controlling for the
state of the economy (Real GDP Growtht-1), the domes-
tic political conditions (Minority Government, Number
of Government Parties, and Election Year), the interna-
tional strategic environment (Alliancest-1, US/Soviet
CINC Ratiot-1, and Changes in US Military Expenditures
as a Percentage of GDPt-1), and capabilities (CINC
Scoret-1). The numerical results are shown in Table 3.
To illustrate the effects of these two dimensions
of government ideology on defense spending, we
predict the level of defense spending for four govern-
ments in the corners of our two-dimensional distri-
bution (5th and 95th percentiles) of ideological
positions (austere-hawks, austere-doves, generous-
hawks, and generous-doves). Figure 3 shows how
these four types of governments respond to an
external shock in the form of large changes in
U.S. defense spending. They argue that changes in
U.S. defense spending represent signals that OECD
democracies also should increase their defense spend-
ing. Whether this is in anticipation of a future threat
or simply taken as a proxy for the state of the Cold
War, Whitten and Williams (2011) anticipate that the
level of defense spending will increase for each type of
government. This appears to be the case; an increase
of over 1.5% of the U.S. defense budget in the late
FIGURE 2 Dynamic Simulations of the Effects of
Civil and Interstate Wars on Personal
Integrity Rights
10The ‘‘no conflict’’ scenario shows the repression score when all
of the continuous variables are at their sample means and the
binary variables are at their modes (0 for all variables). In the civil
war scenario, the variable for civil war is set at 1. The final
scenario has the value for international war set to 1. It is not
necessary to restrict the variables to their sample means and
modes; in fact, richer inferences may be made by placing the
values of the variables at other substantively important values.
For example, we could make the economic conditions mirror
typical values for war-torn states or some set of values from a
historical case.
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1960s (around year 16) leads to an immediate jump
in defense spending for all four governments. In all
four cases, this increase is an important one, as the
predicted level of spending is statistically higher (or
nearly so) in the next period. These types of figures
also illustrate how long it takes various governments
to revert to their previous level of spending. For
generous-hawks, who have the highest level of spend-
ing, the level of spending never returns to its preex-
ogenous shock level but continues to climb throughout
the simulation. Generous-doves and austerity-hawks,
the next two highest levels, take approximately five to
six years to revert to the original level. The effects of
exogenous shocks for austerity-doves, on the other
hand, are not statistically different after the shock; their
levels of spending return to the preshock level (and
actually become statistically lower) much faster than
the other three governments.
As three excellent recent works on interactions
emphasize (Braumoeller 2004, Brambor, Clark and
Golder 2006; Kam and Franzese 2007), graphical
illustrations are crucial to the appropriate interpre-
tation of interactive relationships. This is especially true
when the interactive relationships are estimated over
time. Figure 4 presents the predicted level of military
spending as a percentage of GDP (and their 95%
confidence intervals) for four hypothetical govern-
ments (based on the two dimensions of welfare and
international peace) across the international conflict
levels that France faced from 1950 to 1989. The only
values that change at each iteration are the values of the
lagged military spending as a percentage of GDP and
the interaction of the government welfare and hawk
positions (which become the products of each of the
TABLE 3 Two Dimensional Model of Government Ideology and Defense Spending (Whitten and Williams
2011)
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.) [90% CI]
Military expenditures as a % of GDPt-1 0.933** (0.020) [0.901, 0.965]
Minority government 0.033 (0.031) [-0.019, 0.084]
Number of government parties 0.008 (0.010) [-0.009, 0.025]
Election year 0.008 (0.027) [-0.035, 0.052]
Real growth in GDPt-1 0.404 (0.554) [-0.508, 1.315]
CINC scoret-1 2.231 (2.289) [-1.535, 5.996]
Alliancet-1 0.025 (0.031) [-0.032, 0.082]
US change in mil. exp. as a % of GDPt-1 0.081* (0.037) [0.020, 0.143]
US/Soviet CINC ratiot-1 -0.026 (0.061) [-0.127, 0.075]
Conflict involvement (MIDs composite) 0.012* (0.006) [0.002, 0.021]
Government welfare position 0.007** (0.003) [0.002, 0.011]
Government welfare position 3 conflict -0.001 (0.001) [-0.001, 0.000]
Government hawk position 0.009 (0.006) [-0.001, 0.019]
Government hawk position 3 conflict 0.001 (0.002) [-0.001, 0.004]




Time Points 19 to 46
*p , 0.05 (two-tailed test); **p , 0.01 (two-tailed test).
Note: Cell entries indicate OLS coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses and 90% confidence intervals in brackets.
FIGURE 3 Predicted Defense Spending by Four
Hypothetical Governments as they
Respond to U.S. Changes in Defense
Spending
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ideology variables and the conflict involvement varia-
ble). At each iteration, the value of the conflict
involvement variable becomes the concurrent value of
France’s conflict involvement for that time period.
This figure suggests that governments react to
conflict involvement differently, depending on their
positions on welfare. During times of conflict, hawks
(both austere and generous) have higher levels of
spending than doves (both austere and generous),
but there is no difference between governments based
on welfare. However, when there is no conflict
(between year 15 and 28), the differences between
austere and generous governments become statisti-
cally different from one another because of the drastic
cuts in defense spending orchestrated by austere
governments. This is a counterintuitive finding, one
that might have been ignored without a graphical rep-
resentation of the long-term dynamics of the inter-
action between ideology and international threat.
In the previous four figures, we have shown the
utility of long-term dynamic simulations with the aid
of two research applications. Not only can long-term
dynamic simulations show the effects of key variables,
but they also can illustrate how the predicted values
react to exogenous shocks and changes in the values
of interactive relationships.
Conclusion
We hope that this article leads to an increase in the
use of dynamic simulations for interpreting the
results of models estimated with TSCS data. As
the extensive technical literature in this area shows,
this class of models is prone to many statistical pitfalls.
Despite these problems, the use of these models is
increasing, because they provide valuable and other-
wise unavailable leverage to answer important ques-
tions about the political world. If researchers go
through all the trouble to obtain believable estimates
with TSCS models, they should take the time to make
correct and useful inferences from their results.
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